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• The asymmetric two-player Tullock contest has a unique equilibrium for r ≤ 2. 
• This result completes, in a sense, the analysis of the two-player Tullock contest.  
• We offer a comprehensive view on the comparative statics of the model. 
• We also show that the equilibrium set does not depend on the tie-breaking rule. 
• As an application, we derive a revenue ranking for optimally biased contests. 
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1. Introduction15
Contests are used widely in economics and political theory. Specic applications include marketing,16
rent-seeking, campaigning, military conict, and sports, for instance.1 A useful contest technology,17
conveniently parameterized by a parameter r 2 (0;1), has been popularized by Tullock (1980). Pure-18
strategy Nash equilibria have been identied for low values of r (Mills, 1959; Pérez-Castrillo and19
Verdier, 1992; Nti, 1999, 2004; Cornes and Hartley, 2005), and mixed-strategy equilibria for high20
values of r (Baye et al., 1994; Alcade and Dahm, 2010; Ewerhart, 2015, 2016). For intermediate values21
of r and heterogeneous valuations, Wang (2010) has constructed additional equilibria in which only22
one player randomizes.23
The present paper complements and, in a sense, completes the equilibrium analysis of Tullocks24
model in the important special case of two players and heterogeneous valuations. We rst show25
that, for r  2, the equilibrium is unique. This observation is useful because for r > 2, the usual26
equilibrium characteristics, such as expected e¤orts, participation probabilities, winning probabilities,27
expected payo¤s, and expected revenue, are known to be independent of the equilibrium. Then,28
we document the properties of the equilibrium, including rent-dissipation, comparative statics, and29
robustness. Finally, as an application, we prove a revenue ranking result for optimally biased contests.30
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and reviews31
existing equilibrium characterizations. Section 3 presents our uniqueness result. Comparative statics32
are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 deals with robustness. Optimal discrimination is examined in33
Section 6. An Appendix contains an auxiliary result.34
2. Set-up and notation35
There are two players i = 1; 2. Player is valuation of the prize is denoted by Vi, where we assume36
V1  V2 > 0. Given e¤orts x1  0 for player 1 and x2  2 for player 2, player is probability of winning37
is specied as38
pi(x1; x2) =
xri
xr1 + x
r
2
, (1)39
where r 2 (0;1) is the decisiveness parameter, and the ratio is replaced by p0i = 0:5 should the40
denominator vanish.2 Player is payo¤ is given by i = piVi xi. This denes the two-player contest41
C = C(V1; V2; r).42
A mixed strategy i for player i is a probability measure on [0; Vi]. Let Mi denote the set of43
1Cf. Konrad (2009).
2The assumption on p0i will be relaxed in Section 5.
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player is mixed strategies. Given  = (1; 2) 2M1M2, we write pi(1; 2) = E[pi(x1; x2)j] and44
i(1; 2) = E[i(x1; x2)j], where E[ j] denotes the expectation operator. An equilibrium is a45
pair  = (1; 2) 2M1 M2 satisfying 1(1; 2)  1(1; 2) for any 1 2M1, and 2(1; 2) 46
2(

1; 2) for any 2 2M2.47
For an equilibrium  = (1; 2), we dene player is expected e¤ort xi = E[xiji ], participa-48
tion probability i = i (fxi > 0g), winning probability pi = pi(1; 2), and expected payo¤49
i = p

iVi   xi, as well as the designers expected revenue R = x1 + x2. An equilibrium  is an50
all-pay auction equilibrium if it shares these characteristics with the unique equilibrium of the51
corresponding all-pay auction (Alcade and Dahm, 2010).52
Let ! = V2=V1. The following three propositions summarize much of the existing equilibrium53
characterizations.54
Proposition 1. (Mills, 1959; Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; Nti, 1999, 2004; Cornes55
and Hartley, 2005) A pure-strategy equilibrium exists if and only if r  1+!r. This equilibrium is56
interior, and unique within the class of pure-strategy equilibria.357
Proposition 2. (Baye et al., 1994; Alcade and Dahm, 2010; Ewerhart, 2015, 2016) For any58
r  2, there exists an all-pay auction equilibrium. Moreover, for r > 2, any equilibrium is an all-pay59
auction equilibrium, and both players randomize.60
Proposition 3. (Alcade and Dahm, 2010; Wang, 2010) For any r 2 (1 + !r; 2], there exists an61
equilibrium in which player 1 chooses a pure strategy, while player 2 randomizes between zero and a62
positive e¤ort.63
For convenience, the cases captured by Propositions 1 through 3, respectively, will be referred to as64
the pure, mixed, and semi-mixed cases. See Figure 1 for illustration.465
66
Figure 1: The parameter space.67
3For homogeneous valuations and r  2, the equilibrium is known to be unique even within the class of all equilibria.
4Note the overlap between the cases. Indeed, for r = 2 and ! = 1, the all-pay auction equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Further, for r = 2 and ! < 1, the semi-mixed equilibrium is an all-pay auction equilibrium.
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3. Uniqueness68
The following result is key to all what follows.69
Proposition 4. For any r  2, there is precisely one equilibrium.70
Proof. Assume rst that r  1 + !r. By Proposition 1, there exists an interior pure-strategy71
equilibrium (x1; x2). Moreover, the only candidate for an alternative best response to x1 is the zero72
bid (Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; Cornes and Hartley, 2005). Since equilibria in contests are73
interchangeable (cf. the Appendix), the support of any alternative equilibrium strategy must be a74
subset of f0; x2g. However, player 1s rst-order necessary condition for the interior optimum,75
@p1(x

1; x

2)
@x1
V12   1 = 0, (2)76
holds for 2 = 1, so that it cannot hold for 2 < 1. By an analogous argument, necessarily 1 = 177
and, hence, the equilibrium is unique in this case. Assume next that r > 1 + !r. By Proposition 3,78
there exists a semi-mixed equilibrium in which player 1 uses a pure strategy x1 > 0, while player 279
randomizes, choosing some x2 = x2 with probability 2 2 (0; 1), and x2 = 0 otherwise. As above,80
it follows that player 2s best-response set is f0; x2g. Any alternative equilibrium strategy could,81
therefore, only use a di¤erent probability 2 of randomization across the set f0; x2g. But this is82
impossible in view of (2), which must hold also in the semi-mixed case. Moreover, by the construction83
of the semi-mixed equilibrium (Alcade and Dahm, 2010; Wang, 2010), player 1s best-response set84
is the same as in the associated pure-strategy equilibrium in the contest bC = C(bV1; V2; r), with bV1 =85
V2=(1   r)1=r. Hence, x1 is the unique best response, and uniqueness of the equilibrium follows as86
above. 87
Proposition 4 implies, in particular, that for r = 2, there does not exist any equilibrium other than88
the all-pay auction equilibrium identied by Alcade and Dahm (2010, Ex. 3.3).589
Dene rent dissipation as the fraction i = xi=Vi of the valuation spent by player i. In the pure90
and mixed cases, i is known to be identical for the two players, with   1 = 2 being strictly91
increasing in !. As noted by Wang (2010), this extends to the semi-mixed case, where92
 = (r)
!
2
, (3)93
5Unfortunately, however, the argument does not deliver uniqueness for r > 2 because the best-response set is countably
innite in that case.
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with94
(r) =
2
r
(r   1) r 1r : (4)95
The present analysis shows that  is globally strictly increasing in ! for any r 2 (0;1), regardless of96
the equilibrium.97
4. Comparative statics98
Table I provides an overview of the comparative statics of the equilibrium.6 As can be seen, the99
comparative statics of the semi-mixed equilibrium with respect to V1 and V2 is identical to that of100
the all-pay auction. The comparative statics of the semi-mixed equilibrium with respect to r is as101
follows. As the contest becomes more decisive, expected e¤orts, player 2s participation probability,102
and expected revenue are all strictly declining towards the respective all-pay auction levels. In contrast,103
player 1s winning probability and expected payo¤ are both strictly increasing towards the respective104
all-pay auction levels.105
106
Table I: Comparative statics.107
One can check that all the equilibrium characteristics listed in the table depend continuously on108
parameters. In other words, there are no jumps in the possible transitions between pure, semi-mixed,109
and mixed equilibria. This allows deriving global comparative statics results. For example, Yildirim110
(2015) has made the intuitive observation that, if the contest technology exhibits decreasing returns,111
the weaker player never prefers a more decisive contest. But, as d2=dr  0 holds globally, the same112
conclusion holds for technologies with constant or increasing returns.113
6The table summarizes and extends the results of Nti (1999, 2004), Wang (2010), and Yildirim (2015).
5
5. Robustness114
So far, we assumed that p01 = p
0
2 = 0:5. However, as our next result shows, this assumption is not115
crucial.116
Proposition 5. The equilibrium set remains unchanged when p01; p
0
2 2 [0; 1] and p01 + p02  1.117
Proof. Let  = (1; 2) be an equilibrium under the modied rules that is not an equilibrium in C.118
Since mutual inactivity cannot occur with positive probability in , some player i nds a deviation119
to zero protable in C, but not protable under the modied rules. Moreover, j , with j 6= i, must120
have an atom at zero, and p0i < 0:5. But then, player i has a protable deviation to some small xi > 0121
both in C and under the modied rules. Contradiction! Conversely, suppose that  = (1; 2) is122
an equilibrium in C that is not an equilibrium under the modied rules. Then some player i nds123
a deviation to zero protable under the modied rules, yet not protable in C. Moreover, player js124
mixed strategy j , with j 6= i, necessarily has an atom at zero. Given Propositions 1 and 4, this is125
feasible only if r > 1 + !r. In the semi-mixed case, however, bidding zero yields a payo¤ for player126
i = 1 of127
1 = p
0
1V1(1  2)  V1(1  2) = V1  
V2
(r   1)1=r , (5)128
which is weakly less than129
1 =

2
(x1)r
(x1)r + (x2)r
+ 1  2

V1   x1 = V1  
2(r   1) r 1r
r
V2, (6)130
because 2(r  1)=r  1. Similarly, in the mixed case, 1 = V1  V2, whereas a deviation to zero yields131
only 1 = p01V1(1  2)  V1   V2. Contradiction! 132
6. Optimally biased contests133
Suppose now that a designer may inate or deate player 2s e¤ort by a factor  > 0. I.e., players134
probabilities of winning are given in the interior by135
p1(x1; x2) =
xr1
xr1 + (x2)
r
(7)136
and p2 = 1   p1 . Let () denote the rent-dissipation in the contest C = C(V 1 ; V 2 ; r), where137
V 1 = maxfV1; V2g and V 2 = minfV1; V2g. Since players act as if in C, the expected revenue138
6
from the biased contest is given by139
R() = (V1 + V2)(). (8)140
Franke et al. (2014) obtained a dominance result. Epstein et al. (2013) compared pure-strategy141
equilibria directly with all-pay auction equilibria. The following result ranks a continuum of contest142
technologies, explicitly taking into account the possibility of semi-mixed equilibria.143
Proposition 6. For any r 2 (0;1), the revenue-maximizing bias is  = 1=!, with144
R() = minfr
2
; 1g  V1 + V2
2
(9)145
Thus, the expected revenue from the optimally biased contest is strictly increasing for r  2, and146
constant for r  2.147
Proof. Suppose rst that r  2. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, maximizing148
R() = rV
r
1 (V2)
r(V1 + V2)
(V r1 + 
rV r2 )
2
(10)149
yields the solution  = 1=!, with R() = (r=4)  (V1 + V2). For a semi-mixed equilibrium,150
R() =
8><>:
!
2 (r)(V1 + V2) if ! < (r   1)1=r
1
2!(r)(V1 + V2) if ! > (r   1) 1=r.
(11)151
In the rst case, R() is strictly increasing in . In the second case, R() is strictly declining in .152
Hence, it is strictly suboptimal to implement a semi-mixed equilibrium. For r > 2, the claim has been153
proved by the author in prior work (2016). 154
Intuitively, in an unbiased contest (i.e., for  = 1), asymmetries in valuations introduce a discour-155
agement e¤ect for the lower value player. An increase in the decisiveness may then even amplify the156
discouragement, and therefore lead to a lower expected revenue (cf. Table I). The proposition above157
suggests that biasing the contest can o¤set this e¤ect.158
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Appendix A. An auxiliary result159
Two equilibria (1; 2) and (1 ; 2 ) are called interchangeable if (1; 2 ) and (1 ; 2) are equi-160
libria as well.161
Lemma A.1. Equilibria in two-player contests are interchangeable.162
Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of an argument detailed in Klumpp and Polborn163
(2006, p. 1104), and therefore omitted. 164
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